Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
467 U.S. 229, 104 S.Ct. 2321
U.S.,1984

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

FN1. An eligible tenant is one who, among other things, owns a house on the lot, has a bona fide intent to live on the lot or be a resident of the State, shows proof of ability to pay for a fee interest in it, and does not own residential land elsewhere nearby. Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 516–33(3), (4), (7) (1977).

FN2. See § 516–56 (Supp.1983). In either case, compensation must equal the fair market value of the owner's leased fee interest. § 516–1(14). The adequacy of compensation is not before us.

FN3. As originally enacted, lessor and lessee had to commence compulsory arbitration if they could not agree on a price for the fee simple title. Statutory formulae were provided for the determination of compensation. The District Court declared both the compulsory arbitration provision and the compensation formulae unconstitutional. No appeal was taken from these rulings, and the Hawaii Legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide only for mandatory negotiation and for advisory compensation formulae. These issues are not before us.

[1] [2] In Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra, this Court held that federal courts should abstain from decision when difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided. By abstaining in such cases, federal courts will avoid both unnecessary adjudication of federal questions and “needless friction with state policies....” Id., 312 U.S., at 500, 61 S.Ct., at 645. However, federal courts need not abstain on Pullman grounds when a state statute is not “fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary” adjudication of the federal constitutional question. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1182, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965). Pullman abstention is limited to uncertain questions of state law because “[a] bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).

[3] [4] [5] The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals suggested that, perhaps, the state courts could make resolution of the federal constitutional questions unnecessary by their construction of the Act. See 702 F.2d, at 811–812. In the abstract, of course, such possibilities always exist. But the relevant inquiry is not whether there is a bare, though unlikely, possibility that state courts might render adjudication of the federal question unnecessary. Rather, “[w]e have frequently emphasized that abstention is not to be ordered unless the statute is of an uncertain nature, and is obviously susceptible of a limiting construction.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251, and n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 391, 397, and n. 14, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). These statutes are not of an uncertain nature and have no reasonable limiting construction. Therefore, Pullman abstention is unnecessary.^FN4

FN4. The dissenting judge's suggestion that Pullman abstention was required because interpretation of the State Constitution may have obviated resolution of the federal constitutional question is equally faulty. Hawaii's Constitution has only a parallel requirement that a taking be for a public use. See Haw. Const., Art. I, § 20. The Court has previously determined that abstention is not required for interpretation of parallel state constitutional provisions. See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2279, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).

[6] [7] The dissenting judge also suggested that abstention was required under the standards articulated in Younger v. Harris, supra. Under Younger-abstention doctrine, interests of comity and federalism**2328 counsel federal courts to abstain from jurisdiction whenever federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern *238 important state interests. See Middlesex Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432–437, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521–2524, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Younger abstention is required, however, only when state court proceedings are initiated “before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2291, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975). In other cases, federal courts must normally fulfill their duty to adjudicate federal questions properly brought before them.

[8] [9] In these cases state judicial proceedings had not been initiated at the time proceedings of substance took place in federal court. Appellees filed their federal court complaint in February 1979, asking for temporary and permanent relief. The District Court temporarily restrained HHA from proceeding against appellees' estates. At that time, no state judicial proceedings were in process. Indeed, in June 1979, when the District Court granted, in part, appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction, state court proceedings still had not been initiated. Rather, HHA filed its first eminent domain lawsuit after the parties had begun filing motions for summary judgment in the District Court—in September 1979. Whether issuance of the February temporary restraining order was a substantial federal court action or not, issuance of the June preliminary injunction certainly was. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929–931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2566–2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). A federal court action in which a preliminary injunction is granted has proceeded well beyond the “embryonic stage,” id., at 929, 95 S.Ct., at 2566, and considerations of economy, equity, and federalism counsel against Younger abstention at that point.

[10] The starting point for our analysis of the Act's constitutionality is the Court's decision in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). In Berman, the Court held constitutional the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. That Act provided both for the comprehensive use of the eminent domain power to redevelop slum areas and for the possible sale or lease of the condemned lands to private interests. In discussing whether the takings authorized by that Act were for a “public use,” id., at 31, 75 S.Ct., at 101, the Court stated:

The Court explicitly recognized the breadth of the principle it was announcing, noting:

The “public use” requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.

[11] On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii Act is constitutional. The people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the original 13 Colonies did,^FN5 to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a *242 land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs. The land oligopoly has, according to the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State's residential land market and forced thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes. Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978); Block v. Hirsh, supra; see also People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (CA1), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772, 67 S.Ct. 190, 91 L.Ed. 664 (1946). We cannot disapprove of Hawaii's exercise of this power.

FN5. After the American Revolution, the colonists in several States took steps to eradicate the feudal incidents with which large proprietors had encumbered land in the Colonies. See, e.g., Act of May 1779, 10 Henning's Statutes At Large 64, ch. 13, § 6 (1822) (Virginia statute); Divesting Act of 1779, 1775–1781 Pa. Acts 258, ch. 139 (1782) (Pennsylvania statute). Courts have never doubted that such statutes served a public purpose. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 60–61, 22 S.Ct. 573, 574–575, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902); Stewart v. Gorter, 70 Md. 242, 244–245, 16 A. 644, 645 (1889).

[12] [13] Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in achieving its intended goals. But “whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if ... the ... [state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.” Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–672, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2084–2085, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112, 99 S.Ct. 939, 950, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its *243 means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts. Redistribution of fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market determined by the state legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the eminent domain power. Therefore, the Hawaii statute must pass the scrutiny of the Public Use Clause.^FN6

FN6. We similarly find no merit in appellees' Due Process and Contract Clause arguments. The argument that due process prohibits allowing lessees to initiate the taking process was essentially rejected by this Court in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 108–109, 99 S.Ct. 403, 411–412, 58 L.Ed.2d 361 (1978). Similarly, the Contract Clause has never been thought to protect against the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19, and n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1516, and n. 16, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977).

[14] [15] The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a private *244 purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public. “It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, ... directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use.” Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S., at 707, 43 S.Ct., at 692. “[W]hat in its immediate aspect [is] only a private transaction may ... be raised by its class or character to a public affair.” Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S., at 155, 41 S.Ct., at 459. As the unique way titles were held in Hawaii skewed the land market, exercise of the power of eminent domain was justified. The Act advances its purposes without the State's taking actual possession of the land. In such cases, government does not itself have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.

[16] [17] Similarly, the fact that a state legislature, and not the Congress, made the public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less appropriate.^FN7 Judicial deference is required because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power. State legislatures are as capable as Congress of making such determinations within their respective spheres of authority. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S., at 32, 75 S.Ct., at 102. Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public use.

FN7. It is worth noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not itself contain an independent “public use” requirement. Rather, that requirement is made binding on the States only by incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's Eminent Domain Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897). It would be ironic to find that state legislation is subject to greater scrutiny under the incorporated “public use” requirement than is congressional legislation under the express mandate of the Fifth Amendment.

Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

 [案情]

夏威夷群岛最初是来自东太平洋波利尼西亚的移民殖民于此。这些殖民者建立了封建领主土地制度，岛上的最高领主控制着土地，他将土地转让给一些副领主们开发，这些副领主再将土地转让给次一级的领主，他们管理土地和在土地上工作的农民和其他承租人。所有土地的持有都是根据最高领主的意愿，并最终要归还给他控制，不存在土地私人所有权。从十九世纪以来，夏威夷的领导人和美国殖民者多次试图将土地在国王、领主和平民之间分配，但是并不成功，夏威夷全岛的土地仍为少数人所有。在20世纪60年代中期，在进行了广泛的听证后，夏威夷的立法机关发现，该州近49%的土地为州和联邦政府所有，有47%的土地为72名私人土地所有人所有。立法机关还进一步发现18个土地所有人，拥有约21,000英亩土地，占这些土地的40%。在夏威夷群岛最为城市化的欧胡岛，22个土地所有人拥有72.5%的土地所有权。立法机关认为土地所有权的集中导致居住用土地所有权市场扭曲，土地价格产生泡沫，损害了公众福利和安宁。

为解决这些问题，立法机关决定迫使大片土地的所有人将其土地分割成小块，并考虑要求大片土地的所有人将其租赁给住房所有人的土地出卖。但这一计划遭到了土地所有者的强烈反对。他们指出这将导致沉重的缴纳联邦税的义务。这些土地所有人主张，联邦税法正是他们选择出租土地而不是出售土地的主要原因。因此，为了适应出租人和承租人的双方需要，夏威夷立法机关制定了1967土地改革法。该法设立了以下机制：征收居住用地块，并将征收地块的土地所有权转让给现有的承租人。夏威夷立法机关意图通过征收相关土地，使这些土地的出售是非自愿的，这样就在促进土地所有权再分配的同时，使联邦税较低。根据该法的征收计划，在开发范围内面积不小于5英亩的独户住宅地块的承租人都有权要求夏威夷住房机构征收他们居住的土地。在25个有资格的承租人或该片土地一半地块的承租人（以较少者为准）提出申请时，该法授权夏威夷住房机构举行公开听证，以确定该州取得该片土地的全部或部分是否实现该法规定的“公共目的”。如果夏威夷住房机构认定满足公共目的，它有权指定征收该片土地的一部分或全部地块。该机构随后可以按照征收审理或出租人和承租人之间的谈判确定的价格取得前土地所有人对该土地的全部权利和利益。

在补偿确定以后，夏威夷住房机构可以将土地所有权出售给申请土地所有权的承租人。夏威夷住房机构被授权借给这些承租人最多90%的购买土地款，该机构可以将在出售后10年内享有优先购买权作为最终转让的条件。如果夏威夷住房机构没有将地块出售给居住在该地块上的承租人，它可以将该地块出租或出售给其他人，条件是要通告公众。但是，夏威夷住房机构出售给任何一个购买者或承租人的地块不得超过一块，而且它不能为营利目的经营这些地块。实际情况是，支付征收补偿的资金完全由承租人提供。尽管该法授权夏威夷住房机构就征收发行债券和基金，该机构并未发行任何债券，也没有向征收土地提供任何资金。

1977年4月，夏威夷住房机构举行了关于征收一些被上诉人土地的公开听证。该机构做出了成文法要求的认定：征收被上诉人的土地将实现该法规定的公共目的。1978年10月，该机构指示被上诉人就出售指定的土地与一些承租人谈判。但谈判没有成功，该机构随后命令被上诉人将此事提交强制性仲裁。
被上诉人未按照此命令将此事提交强制性仲裁，而是在1979年2月向联邦地区法院提起诉讼，要求宣布该法违宪，并禁止对该法进行强制执行。初审法院拒绝发布禁令，上诉法院推翻了初审法院的判决，美国联邦最高法院推翻了上诉法院的判决，将该案发回重审。

[分析]

美国联邦宪法第五条修正案的相关部分规定“未经公平的补偿，不得取得私人财产用于公共目的”。这些案件提出的问题是：通过第十四条修正案适用于各州的第五条修正案的公共使用条款是否禁止夏威夷州在进行公平补偿后从出租人处取得不动产的所有权，并将其转让给承租人以改善该州土地使用权集中的状况，我们认为答案是否定的。

我们分析该法是否违宪的起点是本法院在伯曼诉帕克案中的判决。 ^[1]在伯曼案中，法院判决1945哥伦比亚特区促进经济发展法符合宪法。该法规定了对征收权利的全面使用以重新开发贫民区，以及将被征收土地出售或出租给私人。在讨论该法授权的征收是否为了“公共使用”，法院说：我们涉及的问题在传统上被认为是政府的管理权力。试图确定它的范围或探求它的外部边界都是徒劳无功的，因为每个案件都必须根据其具体事实。定义从根本上说是立法机关确定政府目的的产物，这些政府目的不是抽象的，从历史上看也不能进行完备的定义。除非有明确的宪法限制，立法机关所表明的就是对公共利益近乎结论性的宣布。在这些案件中，社会立法所服务的公共需求的监护人是立法机关，而不是法院。这一原则不因涉及的是征收权力就允许例外。法院明确承认其宣布的原则的范围，指出：只要目标是在议会的权限之内，通过行使征收权力实现该目标的权利就很明确。因为征收权力只是实现目的的手段。只要目标是在议会的权限之内，议会就有权决定通过什么手段实现它。这个手段就是利用私人企业重新开发该地区。上诉人主张这就使该项目成为为一个商人的利益剥夺另一个商人的利益。但是只要证明是为公共目的，执行该项目的手段就由议会自己决定。

“公共使用”的要求因此就和政府的管理权力范围相同。当然，即使征收权力等同于管理权力，法院也在审查立法机关关于什么构成公共使用的判断方面发挥一定作用。但本法院在伯曼案中明确，该作用的范围是非常有限的。法院应尊重立法机关关于“公共使用”的决定，除非事实表明这是无法做到。本法院还强调对这种司法克制的违背将导致法院决定何为政府职能，并导致法院基于做出决定时就该问题的观点否定立法，这一做法在其他领域已被证明是不可行的。总之，就什么构成公共使用的问题，本法院已清楚表明将不会用自己的判断替代立法机关的判断，除非该使用很明显没有合理的基础。

本法院的判决的确反复说明：在没有正当的公共目的理由的情况下，即使支付了补偿，也不能为一个人的利益征收另一个人的财产。但是当征收权的行使与可能的公共目的有合理联系时，本法院从未判决公共使用条款禁止在作出补偿后进行征收。基于此，我们认为夏威夷1967土地改革法是符合宪法的。夏威夷曾试图象英国在美洲最初设立的13个殖民地的殖民者一样，改善其统治者造成的土地垄断所带来的社会和经济危害。根据夏威夷立法机关的调查，土地垄断已经人为的阻止了该州居住用途土地市场正常功能的发挥，迫使数以千计的住房所有人租赁而不是购买其住房下面的土地。对土地垄断及与其相关的危害进行规制是州行使管理权力的典型情况。我们不能反对夏威夷州行使这一权力。

我们也不认为该法纠正土地垄断问题的方法是不合理的。该法假定如果很多人愿意却不能以公平价格购买土地，那么土地市场就失灵了。一但土地市场有失灵征兆，该法授权夏威夷住房机构征收相关土地的地块。该法限制任何一个承租人可以购买地块的数量，并授权夏威夷住房机构运用公共资金以确保市场稀释目标的实现。这是发现和纠正市场失灵的全面而合理的方法。当然，该法和其他法律一样可能不能成功的达到其意图的目标。不过法律条款在事实上是否能够实现其目标并不是问题所在，如果州立法机关合理的相信该法将促进其目标，宪法的要求就得到满足。在立法机关的目的合法且方法合理的情况下，就征收是否明智的经验性辩论和关于其他涉及社会、经济因素的立法是否明智的辩论一样，不应在联邦法院进行。州立法机关基于土地垄断对土地所有权进行再分配以纠正市场的缺陷是理性行使征收权力的行为。因此，夏威夷的成文法必然通过公共使用条款的审查。

上诉法院对我们判决的理解过于狭隘。首先它在理解我们关于“公共使用”的判决，特别是伯曼案的判决时，认为该判决要求在征收过程中，政府在某一时段占有或使用该不动产。由于在征收过程中，夏威夷州的承租人一直占有该不动产用于私人目的，因此该法院认定该法是为私人使用进行征收。其次，该法院认为这些判决仅涉及对国会关于存在公共使用决定的审查，而不是对州立法机关决定的审查，由于本案中涉及的是州立法机关的决定，上诉法院认为对关于公共使用的决定进行更为严格的司法审查是合适的。法院认为夏威夷立法机关宣称的目的仅是成文法的理论解释。我们不同意上诉法院的分析。

征收取得的财产被直接转让给私人受益人的事实并不会判定征收只是为了私人目的。本法院长期以来反对任何关于被征收的不动产要用于公众的机械要求。整个社会甚至它的重要部分直接享受或参与任何改善都不是构成公共目的的基本要素。由于夏威夷州土地所有权持有的独特方式扭曲了土地市场，行使征收权力是有正当理由的。该法无需该州对土地实际占有就促进了其目的的实现。在这类案件中，政府无需自己使用该不动产以使征收合法；受到公共使用条款审查的是征收的目的而不是其运作模式。

同样的，一州的立法机关而不是国会作出公共使用决定的事实并不意味着法院对此决定的尊重是不合适的。之所以要求法院对这一决定的尊重，是因为在我们的政治体系中，立法机关更有能力评价何种公共目的应通过行使征收权力来促进。州立法机构和国会一样有能力在其权限范围内做出这种决定。因此，如果联邦或州的立法机关决定行使征收权力有重要原因，那么法院必须尊重其征收是服务于公共使用的决定。

夏威夷州从未否认宪法禁止仅为将私人利益赋予特定个人而征收土地，即使对该征收进行补偿。纯粹的为私人利益的征收不能通过公共使用条款的审查，这样的征收不是服务于政府的任何合法目的，因此是无效的。但在本案中涉及的不是纯粹的为私人利益进行的征收。夏威夷州立法机关制定1967土地改革法不是为了使特定阶层的人群获益，而是为了合法的公共目的：处理夏威夷州土地所有权集中所带来的一定危害。使用征收权力实现这一目标是合理的。因为在该上诉中我们假定公平补偿的要求已被满足，因此宪法第五条和第十四条修正案的要求已被满足。

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关于征收是否满足为公共目的的要求，其通常标准是只要征收与可能的公共目的合理相关，就视为满足为公共目的征收的要求。

在本案中，针对征收不是为公共目的的主张，法院认为，首先如果立法机关判断征收是为公共目的，法院将尊重立法机关的判断，除非对征收财产的使用很明显没有合理的基础。

其次，只要征收权的行使与可能的公共目的有合理联系，就认为征收是为公共目的。在本案中，夏威夷州立法机关征收土地的目的是为了通过对土地所有权进行再分配，以解决土地垄断问题从而纠正市场的缺陷，法院认为这是理性行使征收权力的行为，符合宪法关于为公共目的征收的要求。

再次，法院认为，为公共目的征收并不机械的要求必须由政府使用征收财产，为公共目的征收所指的是征收的目的而不是手段。在本案中征收取得的财产被直接转让给私人受益人的事实并不会导致征收是为了私人目的判定，因为其目的是通过土地所有权的再分配以解决土地垄断问题。