本杰明诉林德纳航空有限公司

Benjamin v. Lindner Aviation, Inc.
534 N.W.2d 400
Iowa,1995.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

FN1. Chapter 644 was renumbered by the editors of the 1995 Iowa Code and is now found in chapter 556F.

II. Standard of Review.

[1] Whether the money found by Benjamin was treasure trove or was mislaid, abandoned or lost property is a fact question. 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 41, at 49 (2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter “1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property ”); cf. Bennett v. Bowers, 238 Iowa 702, 706, 28 N.W.2d 618, 620 (1947) (whether realty has been abandoned is a question of fact); Roberson v. Ellis, 58 Or. 219, 114 P. 100, 103 (1911) (whether money was hidden long enough to be classified as treasure trove was a fact question for the jury). Therefore, the trial court's finding that the money was mislaid is binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1); see Eldridge, 291 N.W.2d at 323 (affirming trial court's finding that property was lost property because supported by substantial evidence).

III. Does Chapter 644 Supersede the Common Law Classifications of Found Property?

[2] Benjamin argues that chapter 644 governs the rights of finders of property and abrogates the common law distinctions between types of found property. As he points out, lost property statutes are intended “to encourage and facilitate the return of property to the true owner, and then to reward a finder for his honesty if the property remains unclaimed.” Paset v. Old Orchard Bank & Trust Co., 62 Ill.App.3d 534, 19 Ill.Dec. 389, 393, 378 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (1978) (interpreting a statute similar to chapter 644); accord Flood v. City Nat'l Bank, 218 Iowa 898, 908, 253 N.W. 509, 514 (1934), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 666, 56 S.Ct. 749, 80 L.Ed. 1390 (1936) (public policy reflected in lost property statute is “to provide a reward to the finder of lost goods”); Willsmore v. Township of Oceola, 106 Mich.App. 671, 308 N.W.2d 796, 804 (1981) (lost goods act “provides protection to the finder, a reasonable method of uniting goods with their true owner, and a plan which benefits the people of the state through their local governments”).^FN2 These *405 goals, Benjamin argues, can best be achieved by applying such statutes to all types of found property.

FN2. The Michigan statute had two provisions lacking in the Iowa lost property statute. The Michigan law provided for registration of a find in a central location so that the true owner could locate the goods with ease. Willsmore, 308 N.W.2d at 803. It also required notice to potential true owners. Id. Because Iowa's statute has no central registry and requires only posting and publication of notice, Iowa's law does not accomplish as well the goal of reuniting property with its true owner. Finally, under the Michigan statute, the local government obtains one half the value of the goods. Id. Iowa's law does not include this public benefit.

FN3. Iowa's lost property statute was adopted in 1851 at Iowa's constitutional convention. Iowa Code ch. 51 (1851). It had earlier appeared in Revised Statutes of the Territory of Iowa ch. 158 (1843).

[3] Although a few courts have adopted an expansive view of lost property statutes, we think Iowa law is to the contrary. In 1937, we quoted and affirmed a trial court ruling that “the old law of treasure trove is not merged in the statutory law of chapter 515, 1935 Code of Iowa.” Zornes v. Bowen, 223 Iowa 1141, 1145, 274 N.W. 877, 879 (1937). Chapter 515 of the 1935 Iowa Code was eventually renumbered as chapter 644. The relevant sections of chapter 644 are unchanged since our 1937 decision. As recently as 1991, we stated that “[t]he rights of finders of property vary according to the characterization of the property found.” Ritz v. Selma United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266, 268 (Iowa 1991). We went on to define and apply the common law classifications of found property in deciding the rights of the parties. Id. at 269. As our prior cases show, we have continued to use the common law distinctions between classes of found property despite the legislature's enactment of chapter 644 and its predecessors.

[4] [5] The legislature has had many opportunities since our decision in Zornes to amend the statute so that it clearly applies to all types of found property. However, it has not done so. When the legislature leaves a statute unchanged after the supreme court has interpreted it, we presume the legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation. State v. Sheffey, 234 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Iowa 1975). Therefore, we presume here that the legislature approves of our application of chapter 644 to lost property only. Consequently, we hold that chapter 644 does not abrogate the common law classifications of found property. We note this position is consistent with that taken by most jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bishop v. Ellsworth, 91 Ill.App.2d 386, 234 N.E.2d 49, 51 (1968) (holding lost property statute does not apply to abandoned or mislaid property); Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376, 379 (1915) (refusing to apply lost property statute to property that would not be considered lost under the common law); Sovern v. Yoran, 16 Or. 269, 20 P. 100, 105 (1888) (same); Zech v. Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 33 N.W.2d 232, 235 (1948) (concluding that if legislature had intended to include treasure trove within lost property statute, it would have specifically mentioned treasure trove).

[6] In summary, chapter 644 applies only if the property discovered can be categorized as “lost” property as that term is defined under the common law. Thus, the trial court correctly looked to the common law classifications of found property to decide who had the right to the money discovered here.

*406 IV. Classification of Found Property.

[7] Under the common law, there are four categories of found property: (1) abandoned property, (2) lost property, (3) mislaid property, and (4) treasure trove. Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269. The rights of a finder of property depend on how the found property is classified. Id. at 268-69.

[8] [9] A. Abandoned property. Property is abandoned when the owner no longer wants to possess it. Cf. Pearson v. City of Guttenberg, 245 N.W.2d 519, 529 (Iowa 1976) (considering abandonment of real estate). Abandonment is shown by proof that the owner intends to abandon the property and has voluntarily relinquished all right, title and interest in the property. Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269; 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property §§ 11-14, at 15-20. Abandoned property belongs to the finder of the property against all others, including the former owner. Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269.

[10] [11] B. Lost property. “Property is lost when the owner unintentionally and involuntarily parts with its possession and does not know where it is.” Id. (citing Eldridge v. Herman, 291 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Iowa 1980)); accord 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 4, at 9-10. Stolen property found by someone who did not participate in the theft is lost property. Flood, 218 Iowa at 905, 253 N.W. at 513; 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 5, at 11. Under chapter 644, lost property becomes the property of the finder once the statutory procedures are followed and the owner makes no claim within twelve months. Iowa Code § 644.11 (1991).

[12] C. Mislaid property. Mislaid property is voluntarily put in a certain place by the owner who then overlooks or forgets where the property is. Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269. It differs from lost property in that the owner voluntarily and intentionally places mislaid property in the location where it is eventually found by another. 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 10, at 14. In contrast, property is not considered lost unless the owner parts with it involuntarily. Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269; 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 10, at 14; see Hill v. Schrunk, 207 Or. 71, 292 P.2d 141, 143 (1956) (carefully concealed currency was mislaid property, not lost property).

[13] The finder of mislaid property acquires no rights to the property. 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 24, at 30. The right of possession of mislaid property belongs to the owner of the premises upon which the property is found, as against all persons other than the true owner. Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269.

[14] [15] D. Treasure trove. Treasure trove consists of coins or currency concealed by the owner. Id. It includes an element of antiquity. Id. To be classified as treasure trove, the property must have been hidden or concealed for such a length of time that the owner is probably dead or undiscoverable. Id.; 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 8, at 13. Treasure trove belongs to the finder as against all but the true owner. Zornes, 223 Iowa at 1145, 274 N.W. at 879.

V. Is There Substantial Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Finding That the Money Found by Benjamin Was Mislaid?

[16] The place where Benjamin found the money and the manner in which it was hidden are also important here. The bills were carefully tied and wrapped and then concealed in a location that was accessible only by removing screws and a panel. These circumstances support an inference that the money was placed there intentionally. This *407 inference supports the conclusion that the money was mislaid. Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 378 (1948) (fact that $800 in currency was found concealed beneath the paper lining of a dresser indicates that money was intentionally concealed with intention of reclaiming it; therefore, property was mislaid, not lost); Schley v. Couch, 155 Tex. 195, 284 S.W.2d 333, 336 (1955) (holding that money found buried under garage floor was mislaid property as a matter of law because circumstances showed that money was placed there deliberately and court presumed that owner had either forgotten where he hid the money or had died before retrieving it).

[17] [18] The same facts that support the trial court's conclusion that the money was mislaid prevent us from ruling as a matter of law that the property was lost. Property is not considered lost unless considering the place where and the conditions under which the property is found, there is an inference that the property was left there unintentionally. 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 6, at 12; see Sovern, 20 P. at 105 (holding that coins found in a jar under a wooden floor of a barn were not lost property because the circumstances showed that the money was hidden there intentionally); see Farrare v. City of Pasco, 68 Wash.App. 459, 843 P.2d 1082, 1084 (1993) (where currency was deliberately concealed, it cannot be characterized as lost property). Contrary to Benjamin's position the circumstances here do not support a conclusion that the money was placed in the wing of the airplane unintentionally. Additionally, as the trial court concluded, there was no evidence suggesting that the money was placed in the wing by someone other than the owner of the money and that its location was unknown to the owner. For these reasons, we reject Benjamin's argument that the trial court was obligated to find that the currency Benjamin discovered was lost property.

[19] We also reject Benjamin's assertion that as a matter of law this money was abandoned property. Both logic and common sense suggest that it is unlikely someone would voluntarily part with over $18,000 with the intention of terminating his ownership. The location where this money was found is much more consistent with the conclusion that the owner of the property was placing the money there for safekeeping. See Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269 (property not abandoned where money was buried in jars and tin cans, indicating a desire by the owner to preserve it); Jackson, 200 P.2d at 378 (because currency was concealed intentionally and deliberately, the bills could not be regarded as abandoned property); 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 13, at 17 (where property is concealed in such a way that the concealment appears intentional and deliberate, there can be no abandonment). We will not presume that an owner has abandoned his property when his conduct is consistent with a continued claim to the property. Linscomb v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir.1952) (applying Missouri law); Hoffman Management Corp. v. S.L.C. of N. Am., Inc., 800 S.W.2d 755, 762 (Mo.Ct.App.1990); Foulke v. New York Consolidated R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237, 238 (1920); 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property §§ 14, 42, at 20, 49; cf. Bennett, 238 Iowa at 706, 28 N.W.2d at 620 (stating that there is no presumption that real property is abandoned). Therefore, we cannot rule that the district court erred in failing to find that the currency discovered by Benjamin was abandoned property.

[20] Finally, we also conclude that the trial court was not obligated to decide that this money was treasure trove. Based on the dates of the currency, the money was no older than thirty-five years. The mint dates, the musty odor and the rusty condition of a few of the panel screws indicate that the money may have been hidden for some time. However, there was no evidence of the age of the airplane or the date of its last inspection. These facts may have shown that the money was concealed for a much shorter period of time.

[21] Moreover, it is also significant that the airplane had a well-documented ownership history. The record reveals that there were only two owners of the plane prior to the bank. One was the person from whom the bank repossessed the plane; the other *408 was the original purchaser of the plane when it was manufactured. Nevertheless, there is no indication that Benjamin or any other party attempted to locate and notify the prior owners of the plane, which could very possibly have led to the identification of the true owner of the money. Under these circumstances, we cannot say as a matter of law that the money meets the antiquity requirement or that it is probable that the owner of the money is not discoverable.

VI. Is the Airplane Or the Hangar the “Premises” Where the Money Was Discovered?

[22] Because the money discovered by Benjamin was properly found to be mislaid property, it belongs to the owner of the premises where it was found. Mislaid property is entrusted to the owner of the premises where it is found rather than the finder of the property because it is assumed that the true owner may eventually recall where he has placed his property and return there to reclaim it. Willsmore, 308 N.W.2d at 802; Foster, 174 S.W. at 378; Foulke, 127 N.E. at 238-39.

[23] We think that the premises where the money was found is the airplane, not Lindner Aviation's hangar where the airplane happened to be parked when the money was discovered. The policy behind giving ownership of mislaid property to the owner of the premises where the property was mislaid supports this conclusion. If the true owner of the money attempts to locate it, he would initially look for the plane; it is unlikely he would begin his search by contacting businesses where the airplane might have been inspected. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment that the bank, as the owner of the plane, has the right to possession of the property as against all but the true owner. ^FN4

FN4. Some jurisdictions require that one in possession of mislaid property use ordinary care to return the property to its owner. E.g., Kimbrough v. Giant Food Inc., 26 Md.App. 640, 339 A.2d 688, 696 (1975); see generally 1 Am.Jur.2d Abandoned Property § 24, at 31-32.

VII. Is Benjamin Entitled to a Finder's Fee?

[24] Benjamin claims that if he is not entitled to the money, he should be paid a ten percent finder's fee under section 644.13. The problem with this claim is that only the finder of “ lost goods, money, bank notes, and other things” is rewarded with a finder's fee under chapter 644. Iowa Code § 644.13 (1991). Because the property found by Benjamin was mislaid property, not lost property, section 644.13 does not apply here. The trial court erred in awarding Benjamin a finder's fee.

VIII. Summary.

All justices concur except HARRIS, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ., who dissent.

SNELL, Justice (dissenting).

HARRIS and ANDREASEN, JJ., join this dissent.

 [案情]
    1992年4月，州中央银行成为一架飞机的所有者。这架飞机的前所有人拖欠了银行一笔贷款，银行由此取得了对飞机的所有权。在当年8月，银行将飞机送到林德纳航空有限公司进行年度常规检查。本杰明是为林德纳航空有限公司工作的，他对该飞机进行了检查。作为检查的一部分，本杰明将翼段从机翼下面拆开，尽管作为常规检查的一部分，这些翼段每年都应该拆开，但是几个固定左机翼翼段的螺丝钉锈的利害，本杰明不得不使用钻头才将它们卸掉。在左机翼里，本杰明发现了两个大约4英寸高的包裹，都用锡箔纸包着。他将这两个包裹从机翼中取出，打开锡箔纸，发现里面是用绳捆在一起并用手帕包着的纸币。这些纸币共为1.8万美元，主要是20美元面值，制造时间在20世纪60年代以前，主要是在20世纪50年代。纸币闻起来有霉味。这些纸币最终交给了基奥卡克警察局。  
    两天之后，主张根据爱荷华州法律第664章他是该笔钱的拾得者，林德纳航空有限公司和银行也对该笔钱主张权利。根据爱荷华州法律第664章，在法律要求的通知发出后12个月内，如果真正的所有人不主张对该财产的所有权，则该财产归拾得者所有。就该笔钱的通知发出后12个月，没有人主张自己为这笔钱的真正所有人。
    本杰明针对林德纳航空有限公司和银行向地区法院提起确认之诉，以确立其对该笔钱的权利。地区法院认为爱荷华州法律第664章只适用于丢失的财产，而该笔钱是被遗忘财产。地区法院将该笔钱判给银行，认为银行作为飞机的所有者对该笔钱拥有排他（除真正的所有者以外）的占有权。法院还认为本杰明是爱荷华州法律第664章定义的拾得者，并判给他拾得财产价值10%的报酬。本杰明提起上诉，主张爱荷华州法律第664章适用于所有拾得财产，任何普通法关于拾得财产的区分都不再有效。他主张，即使按照普通法对拾得财产的分类，他也对其拾得的钱享有所有权。他主张初审法院应该认定该财产为收藏物、丢失的财产或被丢弃的财产，而不是被遗忘财产，拾得者有权拥有该财产。银行和林德纳航空有限公司提起交叉上诉。林德纳航空有限公司主张如果该财产是被遗忘财产，则其应拥有该财产，因为它是财产拾得地：该飞机停放的飞机修理库的所有人。或者，它主张拾得者是它，而不是本杰明，因为本杰明是在为林德纳航空有限公司工作时拾得该笔钱的。银行主张它是财产拾得地：飞机的所有者。最高法院维持了地区法院的判决。
 
    [分析]
    多数法官的意见
    一、爱荷华州法律第664章是否取代了普通法对拾得财产的分类？
本杰明主张爱荷华州法律第664章决定财产拾得者的权利，它废除了普通法关于拾得财产类型的区分。他指出，有关丢失财产的成文法，其意图是鼓励将财产归还给真正的所有人。如果财产没有人认领，则奖励拾得者的诚实。本杰明主张，将这些成文法规定适用于各种类型的拾得财产，能最好的实现这些目标。
    尽管一些法院对有关丢失财产的成文法采取一种宽泛的观点，但是爱荷华州法律恰恰相反。正如我们以前的案例所显示的，尽管立法机关制定了第664章，我们还继续使用普通法关于拾得财产类型的区分。立法机关多年来有很多机会修改该成文法，明确其适用于所有类型的拾得财产。但是，立法机关并没有这样做。立法机关在州最高法院对成文法进行了解释之后，并没有对成文法进行修改，我们推定立法机关同意我们对该成文法的解释。我们注意到我们的观点和大多数州的法院一致。总之，第664章仅在被发现的财产属于普通法定义的丢失财产时才适用。因此，初审法院依据普通法对拾得财产的分类决定谁对该笔钱有权利是正确的。
    二、对拾得财产的分类
    根据普通法，拾得财产有四种类型：被丢弃财产、丢失财产、被遗忘财产和收藏物。财产拾得者的权利取决于该财产归于哪一类。
    被丢弃财产：当财产的所有人不再想拥有该财产，该财产就是被丢弃财产。丢弃可以被所有人意图放弃该财产，并自愿放弃对该财产所有权益的证据证明。被丢弃财产属于财产拾得者。财产拾得者对财产的权利可以对抗任何人，包括该财产以前的所有人。
    丢失财产：当财产的所有人无意的和非自愿的丧失对财产的占有，并不知道其下落，该财产就是丢失财产。根据爱荷华州法律第664章，在法律规定的程序履行后，财产所有人未能在12个月内认领，丢失财产就为拾得者所有。
    被遗忘财产：当财产的所有人自愿的将财产放在某个地方，随后忘记了该财产放置的地方，该财产就是被遗忘财产。它与丢失财产不同的是，财产所有人是自愿和有意的将财产放在了最终被另一个人发现该财产的地方。而在丢失财产情况下，财产的主人是非自愿与财产分离。被遗忘财产的拾得者没有取得对该财产任何权利，对被遗忘财产的占有权属于该财产拾得地的所有人，他对该财产的权利可以对抗除真正的所有者以外的任何人。
    收藏物：收藏物是所有人隐藏的钱币。它有一点古物的意味。要被归为收藏物，该财产必须被隐藏了相当长的时间，它的所有人很可能已经死亡或无法找到。收藏物归拾得者所有，拾得者对该财产的权利可以对抗除真正所有者以外的任何人。
    三、是否存在实质性的证据支持初审法院认定本杰明发现的钱是被遗忘财产？
    我们认为有实质性的证据可以认定本杰明发现的钱是被遗忘财产。在本案中，本杰明拾得钱的地点和钱隐藏的方式是非常重要的。该笔钱被仔细的捆扎和包裹后被藏到只有卸下螺丝钉和翼段才能找到的地方。这些情形支持了这样的推定：该笔钱是有意放在那里的。初审法院依据这些事实得出结论认为该笔钱是被遗忘财产，这些事实也使我们不能认定在法律上该笔钱是丢失财产。只有在考虑了财产被拾得的地点和情形，能推定财产是无意中被留在那里，该财产才是丢失财产。与本杰明的主张相反，本案情形不能支持该笔钱是无意中被放在飞机机翼中的结论。另外，如初审法院认定的，没有证据显示该笔钱是被所有人以外的其他人放在机翼中，也没有证据显示所有人不知道该笔钱的存放地点。基于这些原因，我们驳回本杰明关于初审法院应当认定该笔钱是丢失财产的主张。
    我们也驳回本杰明关于在法律上该笔钱是被丢弃财产的主张。逻辑和常识都表明一个人不大可能自愿丧失1.8万美元并意图不再拥有对该笔钱的所有权。根据该笔钱被拾得的地点，认为该笔钱的所有人将钱放在那里是为了安全起见更为合适。如果所有人的行为与对该财产继续主张权利并不矛盾，我们不会假定所有人丢弃了该财产。因此，我们不认为地区法院未能认定该笔钱是被丢弃财产是错误的。
    我们也认为初审法院没有义务认定该笔钱是收藏物。根据该笔钱的制造日期，该笔钱从被制造出来不超过35年。该笔钱的制造日期、钱的霉味，以及翼段螺丝钉的生锈状况都表明该笔钱可能隐藏了一段时间，但是没有飞机机龄或飞机最后一次检查日期的证据。这些事实也可能表明，该笔钱只隐藏了较短的一段时间。而且，重要的是，该飞机所有权转让情况备有充分的证明文件。记录显示，在银行之前，该飞机只有过两个所有人。一个是银行从其取得飞机所有权的人，另一个是该飞机被制造出来后购买了该飞机的人。没有情况表明本杰明或其他方试图寻找并通知该飞机的前所有人，这样做很有可能会确定该笔钱的所有人。在这些情况下，我们不能说在法律上该笔钱符合古物的要求或很可能该笔钱的所有者无法找到。
    我们认为地区法院有实质性的证据支持其认定该笔钱是被遗忘财产。它被隐藏的情形和它被拾得的地点支持了这样的观点：该笔钱的所有人是是有意将钱放在那里并意图保留所有权。我们受到这样事实认定的约束。  
    四、飞机还是飞机修理库是该笔钱被发现的地点？
    因为该笔钱被认定为被遗忘财产，它就属于拾得地的所有者，而不是财产的拾得者。被遗忘的财产被委托给财产拾得地的所有者而不是财产的拾得者，因为我们假定财产真正的所有人可能最终会记起他将财产放置的地方，会回来对其主张权利。我们认为该笔钱被发现的地点是飞机，林德纳航空有限公司的飞机修理库只是该笔钱被发现时飞机碰巧停放的地方。如果该笔钱的真正所有者试图寻找该笔钱，他会首先寻找该飞机，而不大可能先联系曾经可能检验过该飞机的企业。因此，我们维持初审法院的判决：银行作为飞机的所有者，有权占有该财产，其权利可以对抗除真正所有者以外的任何人。
    少数法官的反对意见
    有人说过，法律的生命是逻辑。如果确实如此，这句话应该适用于本案。
    多数法官赞同一般规则——拾得的钱究竟是收藏物、被遗忘财产、被丢弃财产还是丢失财产是一个事实问题。在决定一个事实问题时，我们应当考虑已知事实，以及从中可以得出的合理推论。这样，逻辑、推理和常识就开始发挥作用。在分析拾得金钱的四种分类后，多数法官决定拾得的是被遗忘财产。结果是银行取得了该笔钱，本杰明作为拾得者却一无所获。该结果不仅很不公平，而且不符合逻辑。
    被遗忘财产是所有人自愿放在某处但后来遗漏或忘记放在何处的财产。本案中拾得财产为两包裹的纸币，共有18,910美元，3到4英寸高，包在锡箔纸里。在锡箔纸里，主要是20美元面值的纸币用绳子捆着被包在手绢里。纸币的制造日期主要在20世纪50年代，有一张是1934年制造的。这两个包裹是本杰明在卸掉被生锈螺丝钉固定住的翼段后，在飞机左翼里发现的。这些事实，满足了第一个要求：财产是被所有人自愿放在某处。但是判定被遗忘财产的第二个条件是所有人忘记财产放在何处。我认为根据事实、逻辑和常识不能认定第二个条件也被满足。一个人将1.8万美元隐藏在飞机机翼里，后来却忘了将这些钱放在何处，这不大可能，也不合理。本案的情形是我认为在飞机机翼中拾得的钱是被丢弃财产。在财产所有者不想再占有该财产时，该财产就是被丢弃财产。该笔钱在机翼里已有很长时间，可能有30年。在此期间，所有人没有就其主张权利。在法律要求的关于该笔钱已被发现的通知发布后，所有人没有就其主张权利。因此，逻辑和法律都支持认定所有人自愿放弃对该财产的任何权益。该笔钱是因为涉及非法毒品交易或是其它非法财产而被丢弃，不得而知。但无论如何，真正所有人的丢弃在法律上发生了并被证明。
    我会判定本杰明作为被丢弃财产的所有者，在法律上对其在飞机机翼中发现的钱拥有所有权。
 
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    英国王座法庭在1722年的阿莫瑞诉德拉米瑞案中确立了就拾得物拾得人的权利优于除所有权人以外任何人的原则。 ^[1]该案原告是一个扫烟囱的男孩，他拾到一枚镶有宝石的戒指。他把这枚戒指拿到被告的珠宝店，以了解宝石的价值。原告将戒指交给了珠宝店的学徒，学徒假借给戒指称重，将戒指上的宝石卸下，并拿卸掉宝石的戒指向被告汇报，认为其值一个半便士，被告于是给原告一个半便士购买该戒指，原告拒绝拿钱，坚持要求拿回戒指，学徒就把卸掉宝石的戒指还给原告。原告因此起诉被告，就被告不法取得原告所有或占有的宝石，要求被告赔偿宝石的价值。该案法官认为，宝石的拾得者尽管并不因此获得对拾得物的绝对所有权，但是他对拾得物拥有可以对抗除所有权人以外任何人的权利。
    确定拾得财产占有权归属的规则其目的在于促进拾得财产归还给失主，并奖励诚实的拾得人。本案反映了就拾得财产，拾得者和财产拾得地所有人之间，以及雇员和雇主之间的权利冲突。在普通法上，根据拾得财产的类型不同，拾得财产占有权的归属也不同。但是从本案可以看出，由于拾得财产类型的不同主要在于拾得财产真正所有人的意图不同，通过推测拾得财产真正所有人的意图来区分拾得财产的类型常常是很困难的。因此，有些州的成文法就抛弃了普通法对拾得财产类型的区别，对拾得财产作出统一规定。通常是要求拾得者将拾得财产交给有关国家机构，该机构按照法律要求的发出关于拾得财产的通知，如果在法律规定的期限内，真正的所有人不主张对该财产的所有权，则该财产归拾得者所有；或该机构将该财产拍卖，在就拾得者发生费用给予补偿，或给予拾得者一定比例的报酬，并扣除相关保管、拍卖等费用后，将拍卖该财产的收入存入特定账户，随时准备真正的所有人提出主张。