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Jacobsen v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Syllabus by the Court Minn.Stat. § 325.01 applied retroactively to a preexisting agreement between a brewer and a wholesaler, as mandated by Minn.Stat. § 325B.15, unconstitutionally impairs the rights and obligations of the parties set forth in that preexisting agreement.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.KELLEY, Justice.This case comes to us as a certified question. The question is: Does the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 325B.01, et seq. , applied retroactively to a preexisting agreement between a brewer and a wholesaler as mandated by Minn.Stat. § 325B.15, unconstitutionally impair the parties' rights and obligations set forth in that preexisting agreement under art. I, § 10 of the Constitution of the United States and art. 1, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota? The trial court denied Anheuser-Busch's motion to dismiss an action commenced by a wholesaler and its vendee seeking damages under Minn.Stat. § 325B.01 et seq. In so doing, it ruled that the Act did not unconstitutionally impair a contract between Anheuser-Busch *870 and its wholesaler, and certified the constitutional question as important and doubtful under Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03(h). FN1 We answer the certified question in the affirmative and reverse.
FN1. The court of appeals certified the question to this court and requested accelerated review under Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 118, subd. 1 and Minn.Stat. § 480A.10, subd. 2(b). We granted the request. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., appellant, is a brewer of malt beverages such as Michelob and Budweiser beer.FN2 Its products are marketed through intermediate wholesalers who distribute the products to retailers for sale to consumers. In 1976, Earl D. and Ernest R. Jacobsen (Jacobsens) owned Saratoga Distributing Company (Saratoga). In September of that year, appellant and Saratoga entered into a written contract entitled “Anheuser-Busch Wholesaler Equity Agreement.” Thereafter, and subject to the terms of that contract, Saratoga became the wholesaler for Anheuser-Busch products in the Duluth sales territory. Because Anheuser-Busch was cognizant of the fact that a wholesalership could significantly affect sales of its products, it reserved to itself the right to approve or disapprove a change in ownership of the wholesale distributorship. Moreover, Anheuser-Busch under the contract had the right to terminate the contract if it did not approve an ownership transfer.FN3
FN2. The parties have agreed to a statement of the record pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 110.04. FN3. Contract provisions relevant to change in ownership provide: Approximately nine months after the execution of the contract, the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 325B.01 et seq. , became effective. Section 325B.06 of the Act provides:
No brewer shall unreasonably withhold consent to any assignment, transfer or sale of the wholesaler's business whenever the wholesaler to be substituted meets the material and reasonable qualifications and standards required of its wholesalers.
FN4. Section 325B.15 reads: FN5. Section 325B.07 providing for penalties, insofar as relevant, reads: FN6. Section 325B.08, in part, provides: FN7. For example, a brewer is prohibited from signing an agreement with more than one wholesaler in a sales territory. See Section 325B.03. Approximately six months after the effective date of Minn.Stat. ch. 325B, the Jacobsens negotiated an agreement with Kenneth Stretar, the sole owner of Ribbon Distributing, Inc. (Ribbon), whereby Ribbon would purchase Saratoga. The agreement was contingent upon Ribbon's ability to obtain the consent of Anheuser-Busch to handle its products.
After Saratoga had submitted to Anheuser-Busch a formal request for approval of the proposed ownership change, Anheuser-Busch, citing three reasons, disapproved the proposed transfer.FN8
FN8. The declination was by letter dated January 18, 1978 from Anheuser-Busch's vice-president of sales operations. Insofar as relevant, it read: Thereafter, the Jacobsens and Ribbons sued appellant. Following dismissals of some counts, the only claims remaining in 1985 charged Anheuser-Busch with unreasonable conduct prohibited by Minn.Stat. §§ 325B.01 to 325B.17 (1980).FN9 Respondents sought actual and punitive damages plus attorney fees. Anheuser-Busch moved to dismiss. It claimed the retroactive application of the statute, Minn.Stat. § 325B.15 (1984), unconstitutionally impaired the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract executed prior to the Act's effective date under U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 and Minn. Const. art. 1, sec. 11. After “reluctantly” concluding that the impairment of contract did not rise to constitutional dimension, the trial court denied the motion but certified the question as important and doubtful.
FN9. In the initial complaint, Jacobsens sued individually and as co-trustees under voluntary proceedings for the liquidation and dissolution of Saratoga. Originally the complaint contained four counts. Prior to trial, the court dismissed the Jacobsens' individual claims and a count for tortious interference with contractual relations. A count alleging breach of contract was withdrawn by respondents before trial. We commence our analysis of the issues raised by referring to certain rules applicable*872 in a case where the constitutionality of a legislative act is challenged. Since the certified question is solely a legal one, we need to give no deference to the trial court decision. Frost-Benco Electric Association v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn.1977). However, every legislative enactment comes to the court with a presumption in favor of its constitutionality. Federal Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 39, 229 N.W.2d 144, 154 (1975). Therefore, the burden rests with the challenger to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the challenged Act violates a constitutional provision. Id.
[1]
 [2] Here, the sections of the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act are challenged by Anheuser-Busch as violating the contract clauses of both the Constitutions of the United States and of Minnesota.FN10 Though the language of the contract clauses in both Constitutions is absolute, courts have indicated the prohibitions of such contract clauses must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the state “to safeguard the vital interests of its people.” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410, 103 S.Ct. 697, 704, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983), quoting Home Building & Loan Associates v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434, 54 S.Ct. 231, 238, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934). In Christensen v. Minneapolis Municipal Employees Retirement Board, 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn.1983), we noted and applied the three-part test enunciated in Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-13, 103 S.Ct. at 704-06, to determine whether a contractual impairment was unconstitutional. Using the Energy Reserve analysis, a court initially considers whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual obligation. The severity of the impairment increases the level of scrutiny to which the legislation is subjected. See Christensen 331 N.W.2d at 750-51. Secondly, if a substantial impairment exists, those urging the constitutionality of the legislative act must demonstrate a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the legislation. Id. Finally, the legislature's action is examined in the light of this public purpose to see whether the adjustment of the rights and liabilities of the contracting parties is based upon resaonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the law's adoption. Id. FN11FN10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 provides: “No State shall * * * pass any * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts.” Minn. Const. art. 1, § 11 states: “No * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed * * *.” FN11. A suggestion as to the nature and scope of the “significant and legitimate” public purpose is stated by the Eighth Circuit: “A serious alteration of the terms of a contract resulting from state legislation is permissible if, but only if, the legislation is necessary to meet a broad and pressing social or economic need, if the legislation is reasonably adopted for the solution of the problem involved, and if it is not over broad or over harsh.” White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 599 F.2d 283, 287 (8th Cir.1979), aff'd. 444 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 223, 62 L.Ed.2d 166 (1979) (emphasis supplied). All parties concede that in the wholesale equity agreement with Saratoga, Anheuser-Busch reserved to itself the unrestricted right to approve or disapprove any proposed change in the ownership of Saratoga. The Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act, specifically made retroactive by the legislature, prohibits a brewer from “unreasonably withholding consent” to a sale of a wholesaler's business “whenever the wholesaler to be substituted meets the material and reasonable qualifications and standards required of its wholesalers.” Minn.Stat. § 325B.06 (1984). From this language Anheuser-Busch contends that the Act has severely impaired its reasonable contractual expectation by stripping it of its contractual right to freely exercise its business judgment in deciding whether to approve or disapprove a franchise transfer. As the result, Anheuser-Busch points out, it now faces a judicial determination on the reasonableness of its business decision. Accordingly, it argues, the Act replaces its unfettered business discretion with statutory standards, the violation of which *873 makes the company potentially liable for unusual compensatory damages as well as punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees.
To the contrary, the wholesalers assert that the contractual impairment at best was minimal, first, because the Act merely requires a brewer to be reasonable in withholding consent to a transfer of the franchise. Secondly, they assert Anheuser-Busch's reasonable contractual expectations could not have been thwarted given the extreme regulation of the liquor industry in Minnesota. They note the broad police powers given to the states to regulate traffic in liquor under the U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2, and likewise cite numerous provisions of the Intoxicating Liquor Act, Minn.Stat. § 340A et seq. Accordingly they claim Anheuser-Busch should have anticipated statutory changes regulating termination and transfer of wholesale franchises.FN12
FN12. The wholesalers also argue Anheuser-Busch could reasonably have anticipated the state's franchise laws, Minn.Stat. ch. 80C, would, in time, be applied to the brewer-wholesaler relationship. Section 80C.14 of the Franchise Act prohibits unfair practices and requires “good cause” terminations. That a company should foresee a legislature's expansion of a law seems highly speculative. For example in 1984, the legislature repealed section 80C.146 effective July 1, 1986. 1984 Minn.Laws, ch. 444, § 4. Thus the question is raised whether Anheuser-Busch should have similarly anticipated a repeal of this provision of the Franchise Act. [3]
In ascertaining the scope of permissible contractual impairment, courts using the Energy Reserves approach will consider whether the industry involved has been regulated in the past. See, e.g., Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411, 103 S.Ct. at 704. Without doubt, states possess large powers to regulate not only the importation of liquor from other jurisdictions, but also its intrastate distribution. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107, 100 S.Ct. 937, 944, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980); State Board v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 57 S.Ct. 77, 81 L.Ed. 38 (1936). Nevertheless, while the 21st amendment to the United States Constitution and liquor industry regulations contained in state statutes and regulations may be relevant to the inquiry, they are not dispositive. For example, in Midcal, the Supreme Court of the United States in striking down California's wine pricing system as violating the Sherman Act commented:Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.
While Anheuser-Busch acknowledges that states have broad regulatory authority over the importation and distribution of liquor within their boundaries, it argues nonetheless that Anheuser-Busch could not reasonably anticipate the adoption of chapter 325B because Minnesota had never previously attempted to regulate a brewer's contractual right to disapprove a wholesaler's proposed change of ownership.FN13 Particularly*874 it asserts that even if it be conceded the state has the power to enact legislation regulating the terms of distributor contracts, there exists no justification sufficient to permit its retroactive application so as to impair contracts entered into antecedent to the effective date of the legislation.
FN13. Respondents contend that Anheuser-Busch could reasonably anticipate legislation in the nature of chapter 325B because the agreement contained a provision in the contract reading, “The laws, rules and regulations of the jurisdiction in which wholesaler conducts his business to the extent that they may now or hereafter bear upon the contractual relationship between wholesaler and Anheuser-Busch is hereby incorporated in this agreement and made a part hereof.” Reading this provision in historical context, however, makes clear that this provision affects the relationship between Anheuser-Busch and Saratoga insofar as it bears on duties, prohibitions, etc. of each relative to the laws governing the marketing of beer in Minnesota. The courts of several sister jurisdictions which have considered somewhat similar statutes or regulations which attempt to proscribe terminations or transfers of this nature have held such attempts to violate impairment of contract clauses of federal or state constitutions. See, e.g., Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distiller's Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del.Supr.1971) (statute invalid as impairment of obligation of contract because of substantive changes the Act made in the rights and obligations of a distributor's contract); United States Brewers' Association v. State, 192 Neb. 328, 220 N.W.2d 544 (1974) (statute declared unconstitutional invasion of personal and property rights). Other jurisdictions have sustained the validity of similar statutes by holding the legislative enactments were not applicable to contracts in existence at the effective date of the statute, or in other words that they were not retroactive. See, e.g., Superior Motors, Inc. v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 773 (D.S.C.1973); AFA Distributing Co., Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Company, 470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir.1973); Wipperfurth v. U-Haul Co. of Western Wisconsin, 101 Wis.2d 586, 304 N.W.2d 767 (1981).
Absent Minn.Stat. ch. 325B with its retroactivity provision, Anheuser-Busch's disapproval of the transfer of the wholesale agreement would have afforded no legal recourse to Saratoga or Ribbon. The fact the disapproval gave rise to no liability based upon the contract is evidenced by respondents' voluntary withdrawal of the contract claim. Instead of being able to invoke a contract provision that was legal under the law at the time the contract was executed, the brewer now faces a trial based solely on claimed violation of the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act with a measure of damages nonexistent under the prior contract law, plus possible exposure to punitive damages not available under prior contract law, Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 52 (Minn.1983) (punitive damages for breach of contract are not available under either common law or Minn.Stat. § 549.20), plus an award of attorney fees normally not heretofore recoverable in this type of action, Barr/Nelson, 336 N.W.2d at 53; Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71, 79 (Minn.1981) (Both cases cite that this court has “long held that attorney fees are not recoverable in litigation unless there is a specific contract permitting or a statute authorizing such recovery.”). In our view this indeed constitutes a substantial impairment.
[4]
Nevertheless, even if the Act constitutes a substantial impairment of contract, if there exists a significant and legitimate purpose behind the statute such as “remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem,” the Act may yet be sustained because the successful establishment of the existence of a legitimate public purpose serves to provide evidence that the state in enacting the regulation was exercising its police power instead of providing a benefit to special interests. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-12, 103 S.Ct. at 704-05.[5]
Here, however, there exists absolutely no showing that the disruption of the contractual expectations of Anheuser-Busch and Saratoga was necessary to meet any important, broad, and general economic or social problem. Instead, the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act has all the earmarks of narrow special interest*875 legislation devoid of any broad public purpose. Since 1973 in Minnesota it has been the policy of this state expressed through legislative enactment that exclusive wholesale distributorships be abolished to meet the social end of elimination of monopolistic practices and to promote price competition. 1973 Minn.Laws 664 § 3.FN14 See Federal Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 229 N.W.2d 144 (1975). Likewise, the Cash Beer Law, Minn.Stat. § 340.405 (1980), which prohibits brewers and wholesalers from extending credit to retailers of intoxicating malt liquors was addressed to the same general social policy of prevention of vertical integration of the intoxicating malt beverage industry, thereby promoting competition and restricting monopolistic market power. Haskell's, Inc. v. Sopsic, 306 N.W.2d 555 (Minn.1981). In contrast to these statutes reflecting this anti-monopolistic public policy, the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act on its face is anti-competitive, contrary to the long-standing public policy of the state. Instead, it appears to be primarily special interest legislation in favor of the wholesaler distributors. Indeed, an examination of the legislative history reveals that this legislation arose not in response to any broad and general social or economic problem, but rather at the instigation and promotion of beer distributors. The prime arguments of sponsors for its enactment on the floors of the legislature demonstrate that this was an act promoted by and to serve wholesale beer distributors.FN15FN14. This section is now coded in Minn.Stat. ch. 340A (1985 Supp.) known as the Intoxicating Liquor Act. In chapter 340A.307, that Act requires all importers to offer for sale on an equal basis to all licensed wholesalers all intoxicating liquors brought into the state. The Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act effectively carves out an exception to the liquor act by disallowing dual distribution of a particular brand within a sales territory. See Minn.Stat. § 325B.03 (1984). See also Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (if irreconcilable provisions, special provision shall prevail and be construed as exception to general provision). FN15. The bill introduced in the senate was originally an amendment to Chapter 80C, the Minnesota Franchise Law. It is not exactly clear why it was codified as chapter 325B. We can ascertain “no significant or legitimate public purpose” in the Act. While it may remedy a perceived problem of beer wholesalers, it was obviously not intended to remedy a “broad and general social or economic problem” contemplated by the language of Energy Reserves. It should be kept in mind, however, that the issue here is not whether the legislature could regulate prospectively contracts of this nature, but rather whether the statute can be retroactively applied absent a “significant and legitimate public purpose.” We address no other issue than that in this opinion.
Having ruled that there was no “significant and legitimate public purpose” to be remedied by the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act, it is unnecessary to address the third part of the Energy Reserves test.
Accordingly, our answer to the certified question is that the Minnesota Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act, Minn.Stat. § 325B.01, et seq. applied retroactively to a preexisting agreement between a brewer and a wholesaler as mandated by Minn.Stat. § 325B.15 does unconstitutionally impair the parties' rights and obligations set forth in that preexisting agreement, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 and Minn. Const. art. 1, § 11.
Reversed.
YETKA, J., dissents.YETKA, Justice (dissenting).The states are given broad police powers in regulating traffic in liquor under U.S. Const. art. XXI, § 2. Moreover, even without the passage of this act, it appears to me that plaintiffs here would have a right to recourse on the grounds that there must be some reasonable basis for denying the transfer of the franchise. The agreement between the parties itself states that Anheuser-Busch agrees to abide by both existing and future amendments to the liquor laws of Minnesota.
*876 The laws, rules and regulations of the jurisdiction in which Wholesaler conducts its business, to the extent that they may now or hereafter bear upon the contractual relationships between Wholesaler and Anheuser-Busch, are hereby incorporated in this Agreement and made a part hereof.
Accordingly, in my opinion, the Minnesota act ought to be upheld.
【案由】 安瑟-巴斯克提出动议，请求驳回批发商及其买主根据明《尼苏达州法典》§325B.01及以下各条款提出的要求损害赔偿的诉讼请求，初审法院拒绝了。然后，法院判决法案没有违宪性地损害安瑟-巴斯克公司和它的批发商之间的合同，并根据明尼苏达州民事诉讼程序法有关规定，将宪法问题作为一个重要而有疑问的问题提交审查。我们对提交审查的问题的答案是肯定的，并推翻原判。
【判决意见】
凯利法官：
上诉人安瑟-巴斯克公司是一个麦芽酒精饮料制造商，生产百威及其他品牌的啤酒，其产品主要通过中间批发商进行销售，批发商将产品分销给零售商再卖给消费者。1976年，埃尔和雅戈布森二人（以下称雅戈布森）共同设立了萨拉图销售公司（以下称萨拉图公司）。当年9月，上诉人与萨拉图公司签订了书面合同“安瑟－巴斯克公司批发商权益协议”。之后，根据该合同的规定，萨拉图公司成为安瑟－巴斯克公司在杜鲁市销售区域的批发商。因为安瑟－巴斯克公司认识到批发关系可能严重地影响到其产品的销售，它将变更批发经销权的权利保留给自己。而且，根据合同，如果安瑟－巴斯克公司不同意经销权转让，其还有权终止合同。 合同中与权利变更有关的规定如下：
4. 批发商的权利
……（1）除非根据以下（2）款中的规定，批发商转让批发经销权之前，应得到安瑟－巴斯克公司的书面同意，否则，不管何时发生批发商批发经销权的变更，并且导致批发商业务控制权的变化，本合同应终止。
（2）批发商有权请求安瑟－巴斯克公司就是否同意做出书面答复，在收到请求文件后的30天内，安瑟－巴斯克公司应书面通知批发商其是否同意；…如果安瑟－巴斯克公司还需要批发商提供额外的信息以便做出决定，批发商应尽快提交这些额外的信息；在收到所有额外信息之日起30天内，安瑟－巴斯克公司应书面通知批发商其是否同意。
在合同执行后大约9个月后，明尼苏达州啤酒制造商和批发商法——明《尼苏达州法典》第325B.01及以下各条款开始生效。该法第325B.06条规定：
如果潜在的批发商满足其规定的批发商的实质和合理的要求和标准，啤酒制造商不得不合理地拒绝任何批发经销业务的转让或出售，
该法明确规定其具有溯及力。该法第325B.15条规定：“第325B.01到第325B.17条规定应包含1977年5月28日之前已经存在的合同，以及1977年5月28日之后签订的合同。”另外，该法其他条款对违反第325B.06条的行为规定了很重的惩罚。第325B.07条规定了罚金，相关的规定是：“…任何啤酒制造商不合理地拒绝同意任何批发商业务的转让或销售，应向批发商支付与被终止的产品或品牌相关的业务价值的合理赔偿金。批发商业务价值应包括但不限于其商誉，如果存在的话。”此外，该法案授权法院提供衡平法救济，给予惩罚性损害赔偿金，并允许要求律师费。第325B.08条部分规定：“法院可以给予衡平法救济，包括但不限于确认判决和禁令救济。如果法院发现啤酒制造商不合理地不同意批发商合同的转让或出售，法院可以判给惩罚性赔偿金以及事实上的赔偿金、诉讼成本和律师费。”法案还对啤酒制造商和相对的批发商规定了其他的限制。
在《明尼苏达州法典》第325B章生效后大约6个月后，雅戈布森与斯塔·瑞布恩二人协商订立合同，由瑞布恩收购萨拉图公司。该合同生效的先决条件是：瑞布恩有能力使安瑟－巴斯克公司同意经销权的转让。
在萨拉图公司向安瑟－巴斯克公司提交变更请求后，安瑟－巴斯克公司提出了三个理由，拒绝转让。该拒绝是在1978年1月18日，由安瑟－巴斯克公司业务部副总裁以信件的方式做出的。有关内容如下：
“首先，考虑到现在瑞布恩代理的啤酒品牌的数量，我们担心你们双方的并购会导致杜鲁市地区啤酒批发市场的垄断，削弱推销和市场营销的力度，而这正是我们所认为的提高我们的市场地位所必须的东西。
第二，我们与杜鲁市地区的零售商及其他人的联系表明，斯塔·瑞布恩先生并未得到该地区零售商的好评。如你们所知，在我们看来，维持批发商与零售商之间的良好关系对安瑟－巴斯克公司产品在市场上的成功是至关重要的。
此外，我们认为，斯塔·瑞布恩先生提交的业务计划完全是不适当的，其阐明的营销战略无法在杜鲁市市场上适当地代理我们的产品。
正因为这些原因，我们认为，同意你们公司将经销权转让给斯塔·瑞布恩先生不符合我公司的最大利益。请理解，这次拒绝完全是因为我们希望确保安瑟－巴斯克公司产品在杜鲁市市场上获得最大限度的份额。”
之后，雅戈布森与斯塔·瑞布恩向法院起诉上诉人。在一些诉因被驳回后，1985年惟一留下的诉因是：安瑟－巴斯克公司不合理的拒绝行为是《明尼苏达州法典》第325B.01至325B.07条所禁止的。
安瑟－巴斯克公司请求法院驳回原告的起诉，称，根据《联邦宪法》第I条第10款的规定以及明尼苏达州宪法第1条第11款的规定，《明尼苏达州法典》§325B.15（1984）的溯及性适用，违宪性地损害了双方当事人在法案生效之前已经执行的合同中所拥有的权利和义务。初审法院拒绝了被告请求驳回起诉的动议，但将这个问题是重要的和不确定为由，将案件提交本院审查。
开始分析这个问题时，我们先查阅了一些立法行为的合宪性受到质疑的案例。对于每项立法，法院首先推定其合宪。因此，除了合理的怀疑外，质疑者还承担了证明被质疑的法案违反了一条宪法规定的举证责任。
这里，安瑟－巴斯克公司对明尼苏达州啤酒制造商和批发商法案中的一些规定提出质疑，认为其违反了美国和明尼苏达州宪法中有关合同的规定。我们注意到，在能源储备集团公司诉堪萨斯电力照明公司案
[1]中，法院阐明的三个测试方法，来决定损害合同的州法是否是违宪。首先，法院考虑州法是否在事实上实质性地损害了合同约定的权利义务。损害的严重性将提高立法审查的层次。第二，如果存在实质性的损害，则那些主张立法合宪的人，必须证明立法背后存在一个重大且合法的公共目的。最后，法院根据这个公共目的来审查立法机构的行为，以判定州法对合同双方权利责任的调整是否合理，且其性质符合立法的正当公共利益目的。审理该案的联邦第8巡回区法院所论述的“重大且合法的”公共目的的性质和范围指：“因州立法导致合同条款的严重改变，只有在以下条件满足时才是允许的：立法必须满足一个广泛且紧迫社会经济需要，且立法对该问题的解决是合理的，不能过于宽泛或过于苛刻。”
各方都承认，在与萨拉图公司的批发经销权合同中，安瑟－巴斯克公司无限制地保留了同意或拒绝变更申请的权力。立法机构明确规定明尼苏达州啤酒制造商和批发商法具有追溯力，如果潜在的批发商满足了制造商对其批发商应具备的合理资质和标准的要求，该法禁止啤酒制造商“不合理地拒绝”批发商转让经销权。安瑟－巴斯克公司提出抗辩，认为法案剥夺了其自由行使商业判断来决定是否同意或拒绝特许经营权转让的合同权利，从而严重损害了其合理的合同预期。相应的，它还辩称，法案用法定标准代替了商业上的自由裁量权，如果违反这一点，公司将可能承担非同寻常的补偿性赔偿金以及惩罚性赔偿金、诉讼成本和律师费。
相反，批发商称，该法案不会对制造商的合同权利造成重大侵害。首先，因为法案仅仅要求啤酒制造商在不拒绝特许经营权转让时提供合理的理由。第二，即使对明尼苏达州的酒业进行最极端的管理，安瑟－巴斯克公司的合理合同期望也可以得到满足。批发商们提到了《联邦宪法》修正案第11条第2款赋予各州管理酒业贸易的宽泛权限，还引用了酒精饮料法（《明尼苏达州法典》§340A及以下各条款）的众多规定。他们还称，安瑟－巴斯克公司本应能预计到立法在管理特许经营权的终止和转让方面的变化。
毫无疑问，各州拥有广泛的管理权限，不仅仅包括对从其他司法辖区进口酒精饮料的管理，还包括对这些酒精饮料在州内销售的管理。然而，尽管《联邦宪法》第21条修正案和州法中包含的酒业管理法以及可能与该行业有关的其他法律，它们不是决定性的。例如，在米德考案
[2]中，美国最高法院为判定加利福尼亚州的酒价格体制违反了《谢尔曼法》。
尽管安瑟－巴斯克公司承认州拥有在其境内对酒类的输入和销售进行管理的广泛权限，但它认为自己不能合理地预测到第325B章会被适用，因为明尼苏达州之前从来没有试图对制造商拒绝一个批发商转让其经销权的合同权利进行管理。特别是，它声称，即使退一步承认州有颁布管理经销商合同条款的立法，也没有正当理由，可以允许法律追溯适用以损害立法生效之前已经签订的合同。
一些司法辖区法院已经探讨了类似法律和规则，他们已经有判决，判定这样的行为违反了联邦或州宪法中有关损害合同条款的规定。特拉华州最高法院1971年做出判决，因为立法实质性地改变了分销商合同的权利和义务，从而损害了合同义务，因此立法无效。 其他一些司法辖区维持了类似法案的效力，判决立法机关制定的法律不适用于法律生效日已经存在的合同，或者，换句话说，这些法律是没有追溯力的。
[3]
如果没有《明尼苏达州法典》第325B章具有追溯力的规定，安瑟－巴斯克公司拒绝批发合同的转让，也不会给萨拉图公司或瑞布提供任何法定诉因。被告主动撤回了对合同的诉讼请求，证明不同意没有导致任何责任这一事实。啤酒制造商未能引用一条根据合同生效时的法律为合法的合同规定，其在初审中完全依赖一个主张，即制造商违反了明尼苏达州啤酒制造商与批发商法案，该法规定的救济措施是损害赔偿金以及可能的惩罚性赔偿金，而根据一般的合同法，这不可能得到。无论根据普通法还是明尼苏达州成文法典，因违法合同而给予惩罚性赔偿金都是不可能的。还有判给律师费，迄今在这种类型的诉讼中一般是不能获得的。 我们的观点是，该法中的这些规定无疑构成了一个实质性损害。
然而，即使法案构成了对合同的实质性损害，如果法律背后存在一个重要的和合法的目的，例如“补救一个广泛和普遍的社会或经济问题”，法案可能就可以继续有效，只要能证明存在合法的公共目的，就可以证明颁布该法的州是在行使其管理权限，而不是向特定的利益集团提供好处。但是，几乎没有证据可以证明，打破安瑟－巴斯克公司和萨拉图公司的合同期望，对于解决某个重要的、广泛和普遍的经济或社会问题是必须的。相反，明尼苏达州啤酒制造商和批发商法案具有所有狭隘的特殊利益集团立法的特征，而没有任何广泛的公共目标。从1973年起，明尼苏达州制定立法的政策一直都是：剥夺排他性批发商的经销权，以满足结束垄断操作的需要，并促进价格竞争，例如明尼苏达州的烈性酒法、啤酒法。与这些反映反垄断的社会政策相反，明尼苏达州啤酒制造商和批发商法是反对竞争的，与州的长期公共政策相违背。相反，该法案看起来主要是对批发经销商有利的特殊利益集团的立法。确实，考察立法历史，可以发现该立法不是为了应对任何广泛和普遍的社会或经济问题，而是在啤酒经销商的教唆和推动下进行的。立法机构的立法发起者的主要抗辩理由是：该法案是由啤酒批发商推动并为之服务的。
我们可以确定该法案中并不存在“重要或合法的公共政策目标”。该法案或许可以解决啤酒批发商关注的问题，但是，很明显，其目的不是为了解决“广泛和普遍的社会或经济问题”。应该记住，本案中的问题是，在不存在一个“重要和合法的公共目标”的情况下，立法是否可以追溯性地适用。
既然已经判决了明尼苏达州啤酒制造商和批发商法没有任何“重要和合法的公共目标”，因此，就没有必要讨论能源储备集团案标准的第三部分。
相应的，我们对提交审查的问题的答案是：根据《联邦宪法》第I条§10和明尼苏达州宪法第1条§11的规定，明尼苏达州啤酒制造商和批发商法（《明尼苏达州法典》§325B.01及以下各条款）追溯适用于一个啤酒制造商和批发商之间之前已经存在的合同，确实违宪性地损害了立法颁布之前存在的合同中规定的双方当事人的权利和义务。
推翻原决。
亚塔法官的反对意见
《联邦宪法》第XXI条第2款赋予各州在管理酒类市场上的广泛管辖权。而且，即使本法案没有通过，在我看来，原告本应有权根据以下理由提出追索权：拒绝特许经营权的转让必须提供合理理由。另外，当事人之间的合同本身就规定，安瑟－巴斯克公司同意遵守明尼苏达州酒法现有的和未来的修正案，因此自愿接受了该法案的管辖。
相应的，我认为，明尼苏达州的立法应予以支持。
【评析】
本案属于违宪审查案件。宪法赋予当事人缔约自由的权利，且未经法律正当程序不得被剥夺。如果各州制定的法律侵害了公民的上述宪法权利，应属违宪。在审查州法是否违宪问题上，法院采用三层次审查标准。第一，州法是否在事实上实质性地损害了合同约定的权利义务？第二，如果存在实质性的损害，则该立法背后是否存在一个重大且合法的公共利益考虑？第三，该立法对合同双方权利责任的调整是否能够实现该公共利益？
本案法院经过分析认为，州法规定的追溯适用效力对当事人的合同权利造成了实质性的损害，但是该州法背后却不存在一个具有广泛经济社会影响的公共利益目的。因此，该立法违宪。
本案有关特许经营的成文法目的就是对被特许人提供额外的法律保护，但是，这种保护更倾向于对个人被特许人弱势群体提供保护。在本案中，啤酒批发经销商显然不属于弱势群体，是个特殊利益集团，并没有广泛的社会利益。
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